Commentary on: Moira Howes\u27  Does happiness increase the objectivity of arguers? by Bailin, Sharon
University of Windsor 
Scholarship at UWindsor 
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 10 
May 22nd, 9:00 AM - May 25th, 5:00 PM 
Commentary on: Moira Howes' "Does happiness increase the 
objectivity of arguers?" 
Sharon Bailin 
Simon Fraser University, Department of Education 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive 
 Part of the Philosophy Commons 
Bailin, Sharon, "Commentary on: Moira Howes' "Does happiness increase the objectivity of arguers?"" 
(2013). OSSA Conference Archive. 79. 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA10/papersandcommentaries/79 
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at 
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized 
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca. 
Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario 
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-3. 
Commentary on: Moira Howes’s “Does happiness increase the 
objectivity of arguers?” 
 
SHARON BAILIN 
 
Education 
Simon Fraser University 
Burnaby, BC 
Canada  
bailin@sfu.ca  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Does happiness increase the objectivity of arguers? Howes’s view is that it does, and 
in support of this claim she draws on two main lines of argument. One focuses on 
the relationship between objectivity, social intelligence and the creation of more 
positive intellectual communities. The second focuses on psychological research 
which purports to show how positive affect might enhance arguer and audience 
objectivity. 
 With respect to her overarching claim, I would certainly not disagree with 
her contention that we should find ways to elucidate, value and support happiness. 
In addition, I find myself in agreement with some specific claims, for example, that a 
certain type of community is important for objectivity (critical thinking), that there 
is a connection between emotion or affect and objectivity (critical thinking), and, 
more broadly, that psychological research can be relevant to discussions of critical 
thinking (for example, the cognitive bias research). 
 Where I shall focus my commentary is on her conception of the two main 
concepts which underpin the central claim, objectivity and happiness, and on her 
account of the relationship between them.  
 
2. OBJECTIVITY 
 
There are two salient aspects to the view of objectivity which Howes puts forward: 
one, that it involves acquiring (or attempting to acquire) an understanding of reality 
which is unbiased; and two, that it involves a commitment which is social. 
 The idea of acquiring an unbiased view of reality captures what I think is a 
central feature of the concept of objectivity. My own characterization of objectivity 
would be in terms of giving fair-minded consideration to arguments on all sides of 
an issue, and avoiding bias in evaluating positions and arguments and in making 
judgments.  
 The idea that objectivity involves a social commitment is less obvious. I 
would characterize objectivity as an achievement rather than as primarily a 
commitment, implying not only effort or intention but also some degree of success 
in acquiring the unbiased view. Moreover, the idea that objectivity is primarily 
social I find problematic. Objectivity can be, and often is, ascribed to individuals -- an 
SHARON BAILIN 
2 
individual can be objective in his or her evaluations and judgments, and the habit of 
mind or virtue of fair-mindedness is an instantiation of objectivity. One might say 
that a community of inquirers could exhibit objectivity in terms of how they 
collaboratively evaluate views and make judgments. Moreover, the promotion of 
certain aspects of the ‘critical spirit’ within a community of inquiry (e.g.. fair-
mindedness, seriously listening to others’ views and treating them with respect) 
could foster objectivity among members of the community. I also agree with Howes 
that a diversity of perspectives is important and thus a critical consideration of 
alternative views is essential to attaining objectivity, although this type of 
consideration can be undertaken by an individual thinking through an issue on his 
or her own. Another way in which objectivity might be seen to be social is that, in 
order to make a reasoned judgment one needs to refer to public reasons, and not 
reasons which are private or subjective. In these ways I can see a social dimension 
to objectivity. I suspect, however, that my take falls considerably short of Howes’s 
view that any account of objectivity should begin with the social. 
 
3. HAPPINESS 
 
The paper makes its claim with respect to two different senses of happiness, 
subjective happiness and eudaimonic happiness. These are very distinct notions, 
however, and one does not necessarily imply the other. A person might well, at some 
moments, feel subjectively happy because of some passing circumstance or incident 
even while not living well in the Aristotelian sense. Moreover, we might think that a 
Socrates, even dissatisfied, might achieve eudaimonia. Thus it is important not to 
conflate the two senses and to examine the claim regarding the connection of 
objectivity and happiness with respect to each sense. 
  
3.1 Subjective happiness 
 
Howes’s claim that subjective happiness increases the objectivity of arguers draws 
support from the psychological literature which casts doubt on the claim that 
depressed people have more realistic perceptions of reality. What the 
inconclusiveness of this literate reinforces for me is the belief that the relationship 
between subjective happiness and objectivity is a contingent one. How accurate a 
perception one has of reality is likely independent of the emotional cast which one 
brings to that reality. One might have an optimistic or a pessimistic outlook on the 
same reality. Those who see the glass as half empty and those who see it as half full 
could well have an equally accurate and objective view of the quantity of liquid in 
the glass. The issue seems less a question of objectivity and more a matter of 
emotional framing. 
 This brings us to Howes’s discussion of the role of emotion with respect to 
patterns of salience and thereby to objectivity. Howes points out, rightly I believe, 
that objectivity requires us to pay attention to relevant features of reality and that 
emotions affect what we pay attention to. And emotions can often lead us to pay 
attention to what is important and relevant. Just as often, however, emotions may 
distort perception, cause us to misread evidence or give undue prominence to 
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certain factors. And this is not just the case for negative emotions. An overly positive 
or ‘happy’ view of someone might cause one to fail to notice negative behaviours 
which could lead to significant problems or risks. Thus there is a need for an 
‘objective’ critical examination of the appropriateness of one’s emotions. So, 
although Howes may be correct that emotion regulation of a certain sort is 
necessary for objectivity, I would also want to claim that appropriately regulating 
one’s emotions requires critical evaluation and thus objectivity. 
 I agree that the interconnectedness of emotion and reason does indeed have 
important implications for the enhancement of objectivity, and critical thinking 
more broadly. I see this not in terms of enhancing happiness in order to enhance 
objectivity, however, but rather in terms of fostering positive emotions with respect 
to the enterprise and virtues of critical thinking, for example encouraging such 
‘rational passions’ as intellectual curiosity, a love of truth and distaste for bias, and a 
respect for the arguments of others.  
 
3.2 Eudaimonic happiness 
 
What of the second claim, that eudaimonic happiness increases the objectivity of 
arguers? This claim is based on the argument that eudaimonic well-being is an 
essential element of good social epistemic relations and that good social epistemic 
relations are important for objective argumentation. An implication of this tripartite 
relationship is that we should support eudaimonic happiness in argumentative 
contexts in order to promote good social epistemic relations which in turn will 
support objectivity. 
 Now I would agree that there is a relationship between eudaimonia and 
critical thinking (and hence objectivity), but I would characterize the nature of that 
relationship somewhat differently than does Howes. Eudaimonia, in the Aristotelian 
sense, comes in fulfilling our human purposes, i.e., living in accordance with reason. 
Thus, on this account, critical thinking (and hence objectivity) is constitutive of 
eudaimonic happiness. So it’s not so much that eudaimonia is a means to the end of 
objectivity in argumentation. It is rather that part of what it means to live well is to 
engage in rational pursuits and rational exchanges. 
 This brings us to another of the key ideas in Howes’s paper, that of 
community. Engaging in rational pursuits and rational exchanges requires being a 
part of and taking part in a certain sort of community, a community of inquiry. Such 
a community aims at rational inquiry and thus an unbiased view of reality. In 
addition, it is characterized by what Howes calls good epistemic (social) relations, 
which I would cash out in terms of open-minded and fair-minded exchanges and a 
commitment to respectful treatment, meaningful participation, and productive 
interaction. A moral I take from Howes’s view, then, regards the importance of 
finding ways to foster communities of inquiry, where rational inquiry is a goal and 
in which epistemic social and intellectual virtues are promoted and encouraged. 
Participating in such a community is a means for living well, in the eudaimonic 
sense. And if we are successful in our educational task, then people will also feel 
happy and enthusiastic about participating in such a community and will be 
positively disposed toward the enterprise and virtues of critical thinking. 
